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NOTES
PARTICIPATION BY A DEFENDANT SPOUSE IN A FOREIGN
DIVORCE ACTION: STATE COURT INTERPRETATION
OF THE "SHERRER" DOCTRINE
A basic premise of our law seems to be that the jurisdictional fact
of domicile of at least one spouse is a condition precedent to a court's
power to render a divorce.' If this "amorphous, highly variable common-
law conception"2 is a prerequisite, the question then arises as to when a
divorce decree of a sister state must be given recognition under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution,' or when such a decree may
be collaterally attacked on the jurisdictional ground that neither spouse
was domiciled in the sister state at the time of the divorce action.4
In 1942, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the first Wil-
liams v. North Carolina case,5 held that a divorce decree rendered solely
upon constructive service of a non-resident defendant spouse is entitled
to full faith and credit when the plaintiff spouse has acquired a bona fide
domicile in the divorcing state. While such a decree was respected in
most states prior to this case,' this was the first time that compulsory
recognition was prescribed. Three years later, in the second Williams v.
1. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 111 (1934).
2. From Justice Rutledge's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 1,
at 255.
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
4. What is domicile? "Bodily presence in a place unaccompanied by an intention
to live there permanently, or at least indefinitely, will not serve to make that place the
domicil." Ulrey v. Ulrey, 231 Ind. 63, 106 N.E.2d 793 (1952). "A person may legiti-
mately move to another state in order to avail himself of its laws, including its divorce
laws, the only requirements being absolute good faith in taking up of such residence
and of the intention of remaining there. . . . The animus manendi, ie., the intention of
remaining indefinitely in the new residence, and the intention not to return to the old,
i.e., the animum non revertandi, are essential elements of domicile." Peff v. Peff, 2
N.J. 513, 67 A.2d 161 (1949).
5. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). This case arose in an extreme situation. A man and a
woman, not married to each other, but each married to someone else, went to Nevada.
They stayed in Nevada for the six weeks statutory residence period, and then each filed
a divorce action in the Nevada court. The absent spouses were not served within the
state and did not appear. After the Nevada court granted each a divorce, they were
married to each other and later returned to North Carolina, where they lived together
until they were indicted for bigamous cohabitation. A conviction, after a trial by jury,
was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction.
6. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
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North Carolina case,7 the Supreme Court concluded that a court in one
state may re-examine the jurisdictional fact of bona fide domicile where
a divorce decree is entered in an ex parte proceeding in a sister state. A
finding of domicile by the divorce state does not preclude another state
from arriving at an opposite conclusion.8
The Supreme Court has handed down three subsequent decisions
which have limited the application of the second Williams case. In
Slierrer v. Sherrer,9 a wife left her home and husband in Massachusetts
and went to Florida with her two children. After three months' residence
she filed a suit for divorce. The husband retained Florida counsel who
entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations
of the wife's complaint, including the allegation of a Florida domicile.
The question of domicile was thus directly in issue. Evidence was intro-
duced by the wife to establish her Florida domicile, and counsel for the
husband failed to cross-examine or to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
The husband apepared personally and testified in the divorce proceed-
ings. A divorce was granted from which the husband failed to appeal.
He subsequently instituted proceedings in Massachusetts collaterally at-
tacking the Florida decree on the issue of domicile. The Massachusetts
court found that the wife was never domiciled in Florida and held the
divorce void.1" The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
state court and said:
[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant
from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional
grounds in the court of a sister state where there has been par-
ticipation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the
jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptbile
to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which ren-
dered the decree."
A companion case, Coe v. Coe,2 differs factually from Sherrer only
in that the non-resident defendant spouse admitted in the pleadings that
7. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The state of North Carolina was not through with
Williams and his purported second wife. They were again tried on the indictment. This
time, evidence on the question of domicile was presented and the judge charged the
jury that the Nevada divorces were valid if the parties had been domiciled in Nevada.
Again the jury convicted, and this time the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the conviction.
8. Accord, Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
9. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
10. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
11. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
12. 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
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the plaintiff spouse was a bona fide resident of the divorce state. As in
Sherrer, the defendant spouse was represented by independent counsel
and had personally appeared and participated in the divorce proceedings
with full opportunity to contest the issue of plaintiff's domicile. Under
these facts, the Supreme Court held that the divorce court's finding of
jurisdiction was res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit. No
subsequent collateral attack on the issue of domicile was permitted.
Finally, in Johnson v. Muelberger,13 the Supreme Court held that a
Florida divorce decree was not subject to collateral attack in a sister state
by the parties or strangers to the original action on the issue of domicile
where counsel for the non-resident defendant spouse appeared in Florida
and contested the merits of the suit, even though the defendant's counsel
did not question the plaintiff spouse's allegation of Florida domicile.
The Muelberger case also suggests, in dictum, that if a defendant spouse
is personally served within the divorce court's jurisdiction, he is pre-
cluded from a collateral attack on an ensuing divorce decree.14
The language of these Supreme Court cases indicates that a divorce
decree cannot be collaterally attacked when the defendant spouse (1) par-
ticipates in the divorce proceeding, and (2) has full opportunity to con-
test jurisdiction. It is clear from these cases that the opportunity of the
defendant spouse to litigate the jurisdictional issue of domicile, not the
actual litigation, is sufficient to satisfy the second element. The defend-
ant spouse is barred from a collateral attack whether he unsuccessfully
contests jurisdiction, admits jurisdiction, or fails to question jurisdic-
tion."5
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet decided what constitutes
participation on the part of a non-resident defendant in a divorce action
which is sufficient to entitle the decree to full faith and credit, and not
subject to collateral attack in a sister state on the jurisdictional issue of
bona fide domicile. The reasoning of the Sherrer, Coe, and Mluelberger
13. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
14. The Mitelberger case and Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), are typically cited
as authority for such a holding. Although the Court does say this is dictum in both
cases, such a holding goes beyond the facts in each. Whether personal service on a
'defendant spouse within the divorce court's jurisdiction is sufficient to require full
faith and credit without participation of any kind, was not the issue before the Court.
Query whether the Supreme Court would follow this language when presented with the
actual question. While it is true that jurisdiction may be obtained over the person of a
defendant by lawful service of process, jurisdiction of the subject matter may not be
obtained in such a manner. At any rate, this may be a situation where bona fide domicile
is not a prerequisite to obtaining a divorce. This certainly could be true if the divorce
state does not in fact determine jurisdiction before granting the divorce.
15. See also Ryan v. Ryan, 139 F. Supp. 98 (D.C. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 230
F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
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cases seems to indicate that any kind of participation is sufficient as long
as the defendant has full opportunity to litigate the question of domicile.
The state courts, however, are not in accord in their interpretation of the
Sherrer doctrine. Through various devices, courts have managed to
avoid giving full faith and credit to a foreign divorce decree even though
the defendant spouse in fact had participated in some manner before the
divorce court.
There are two extremes in this "participation" area, with most of
the problems falling somewhere between. At one end lies the second
Wlilliams situation in which a true ex parte divorce is granted. If the
defendant spouse is not personally served within the divorce state or if he
does not appear or participate in any manner, he may collaterally attack
the decree on jurisdictional grounds." At the other extreme is the situa-
tion in which the jurisdictional issue of domicile was actually litigated in
the divorce court. In such a case, the parties are precluded from a col-
lateral attack.' 7
Although the question of collateral attack is relatively easy when the
defendant makes no appearance and is not personally served in the di-
vorcing state,'8 the problem becomes more difficult when the defendant
spouse technically appears before the court, but such appearance is less
than fair and complete. 9 A signed entry of appearance without any
other participation by the defendant spouse is illustrative of this situation.
Shortly after the Sherrer decision, the Oklahoma court permitted a col-
16. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949);
Ulrey v. Ulrey, 231 Ind. 63, 106 N.E.2d 793 (1952) ; Naylor v. Naylor, 217 Md. 615,
143 A.2d 604 (1958); Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506 (1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 838 (1958).
17. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Tomkins v. Tomkins, 89 Cal. App. 2d
243, 200 P.2d 821 (1948); Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951) ; Breen v. Breen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 554, 199 Misc. 366 (Sup. Ct.
1951) ; Perry v. Perry, 51 Wash. 2d 358, 318 P.2d 968 (1958).
18. In a recent Maryland case, Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506 (1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958), the wife who had procured a Nevada divorce used
a novel theory in attempting to defeat the husband's collateral attack in Maryland.
After the wife had arrived in Nevada but before she filed suit for divorce, the husband,
on two different occasions, had travelled to Nevada for business reasons. He was neither
personally served there nor did he appear in the divorce action. The wife contended
that "he could have accepted service there and raised at that time any meritorious de-
fenses he may have had." Id. at 39, 141 A.2d at 508. She argued that this constituted
an opportunity to raise the jurisdictional question in Nevada without any hardship and
that her husband should not be permitted to collaterally attack the Nevada decree.
Under the second Williams case, she was clearly wrong, and the Maryland court so held.
19. As was stated in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951), the decree of the
divorcing state is entitled to a presumption of validity. "That presumption may of
course be overcome by showing, for example, that [the defendant] never was served in
[the divorcing state] nor made an appearance in the case either generally or specially
to contest the jurisdictional issue."
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lateral attack on an Arkansas divorce decree even though the defendant
wife was shown to have signed an entry of appearance.2" The court
found that the husband had never been a domiciliary of Arkansas. It
felt that since bona fide domicile is a prerequisite to jurisdiction and can-
not be conferred by consent of the parties, the wife's signed entry of
appearance in the divorce proceeding could not cure the absence of the
jurisdictional fact of domicile.
The reasoning of the court appears to conflict with a strict interpre-
tation of the Sherrer doctrine. The court in which the attack is being
made must determine the question of the right to a collateral attack be-
fore it is entitled to determine whether there was a bona fide domicile,
and under the Sherrer doctrine, participation by the defendant spouse
which constitutes full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issue of
domicile precludes a collateral examination of this jurisdictional matter.
The Oklahoma court, however, may have felt that a mere signed entry
of appearance without the filing of pleadings or representation of counsel
is not sufficient participation to constitute a full opportunity to contest
jurisdiction. Such rationale, though not expressed by the court, is
persuasive."
The Louisiana court under similar facts has refused to apply the
res judicata doctrine of the Supreme Court cases.22 It held the Sherrer
doctrine inapplicable when a defendant wife "was not served in Arkansas
nor did she appear to contest the jurisdictional issues."2 The court dis-
regarded the signed "Waiver of Summons and Entry of Appearance"
since neither the wife nor her attorney filed it in the proceedings, and it
20. Brasier v. Brasier, 200 Okla. 689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948). The wife, however,
had filed no pleadings in the divorce action, was not represented by counsel, was not
present at the trial, and no issue had been presented to the Arkansas court relating to
domicile.
21. Furthermore, the defendant wife was apparently uneducated and incapable of
understanding legal matters, while the husband was a very successful business man.
As a defense to the wife's request for alimony in the subsequent Oklahoma suit, the
husband relied on a settlement agreement executed at the time of the Arkansas divorce.
The Oklahoma court held the agreement invalid as obtained by fraud or undue influence;
it was undoubtedly impressed by the disparity in business acumen between the spouses.
This factor may have influenced the court's decision permitting a collateral attack on
the issue of domicile. Interestingly enough, in the Oklahoma action the wife alleged
that the Arkansas divorce was obtained by fraud upon the court. This allegation was
not discussed by the Oklahoma court, but perhaps should have been an alternative,
or preferable, ground for permitting the collateral attack. See discussion of fraud upon
the divorce court, in-fra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
22. Eaton v. Eaton, 227 La. 992, 81 So. 2d 371 (1955). Defendant wife signed a
"Waiver of Summons and Entry of Appearance" in an Arkansas divorce action insti-
tuted by her husband. The waiver was sent to her by her husband and she returned it,
signed, to his attorney. This was the extent of her participation in the divorce pro-
ceedings.
23. 227 La. at 1005, 81 So. 2d at 375.
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had been forwarded to the husband's attorney before the commencement
of the divorce action.24 The court is not clear as to what is sufficient
participation to preclude a collateral attack, but language from the case
indicates that personal appearance or actual litigation of the jurisdictional
issue may be necessary. This goes beyond the Sherrer doctrine. Prob-
ably, the court felt that the defendant wife did not have a full opportunity
to contest the issue of domicile. It would have been on firmer ground
had it used such language in reaching its conclusion.
The factual situations must be carefully considered when the partici-
pation of the defendant spouse is very slight. If the participation is so
limited that it does not constitute a full opportunity to contest the juris-
dictional issue of domicile, the court should clearly allow a collateral at-
tack. The courts, however, should use such rationale in rendering their
decisions rather than wandering in doubtful language.
Participation through a guardian or counsel where coupled with the
other criteria of the Sherrer doctrine is sufficient to preclude collateral
attack.2' The participation, of course, must be authorized. For instance,
an appearance by a guardian of an insane person in divorce proceedings
instituted against the ward has been held to preclude a collateral attack
by the ward upon recovery from the affliction. Such a case arose in
New York after the husband had brought a divorce action in Nevada
while his wife was confined to a mental institution.21 In the divorce pro-
ceeding the guardian contested jurisdiction, but a final decree was entered
for the husband. The New York court held that a wife who later re-
covered from her disability could not contest the validity of the Nevada
decree since the guardian had been properly appointed and had acted
freely and apparently in the best interests of the insane wife. If the
wife had been competent and had appeared herself, she would have
been precluded from attacking the decree; thus, one legally representing
her could likewise preclude her from making such an attack.
24. Further, the Louisiana court relied on the fact that in the Sherrer and Coe
cases, the party had fulfilled the residence requirement, whereas the husband here had
not done so. Such rationale goes beyond the Sherrer doctrine. The issue of plaintiff
spouse's bona fide domicile in the divorcing state is not relevant if by participating in
the divorce proceeding the defendant spouse is precluded from collaterally attacking
the decree.
25. Drew v. Hobby, 123 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Heur v. Heur, 33 Cal.
2d 268, 201 P.2d 385 (1949) ; Daut v. Daut, 98 Cal. App. 2d 375, 220 P.2d 63 (1950) ;
It rc Schomaker's Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 616, 209 P.2d 669 (1949); Jamieson v.
Jamieson, 14 Ill. App. 2d 233, 144 N.E.2d 540 (1957).
26. Breen v. Breen, 199 Misc. 366, 103 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1951). The con-
servatrix of the wife's person and property (her mother) appeared in the Nevada pro-
ceeding subsequent to being granted authority by a Connecticut court and was appointed
guardian ad litem of the wife by the Nevada court.
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In a recent Illinois case,2" the divorcing state, Arkansas, had ap-
pointed an attorney for the non-resident defendant wife. The Arkansas
attorney corresponded with her, and she, via Illinois counsel, wrote back
instructing him how to proceed. The Illinois court said that the Arkansas
appointed attorney could not become the wife's attorney unless "she by
some affirmative action manifested an intent to be so personally repre-
sented by that attorney.. "28 The Illinois court felt that the corre-
spondence constituted such affirmative action and gave full faith and
credit to the Arkansas decree. If the appearance by counsel is not author-
ized, however, the courts will allow a collateral attack as the Pennsylvania
court did where an appearance was entered in a Nevada divorce action
under a forged power of attorney,2" and also where an unauthorized
pleading was filed without the knowledge of the defendant spouse.3"
If the defendant spouse does not have the advice and benefit of in-
dependent counsel, the divorce proceeding may fall short of a full op-
portunity to contest the jurisdictional issue of domicile, in which case a
divorce decree would be subject to collateral attack. The New Jersey
case of Staedler v. Staedler' has resulted in much discussion because it
limited the Sherrer doctrine to a "true adversary proceeding." A hus-
band and wife were having marital problems. The husband's lawyer
drew up an agreement concerning a property settlement and the wife
signed it. The agreement also provided that she would enter "any ap-
pearance required in the divorce proceeding" and that should she "oppose
said divorce proceeding the said trust shall become inoperative and the
monies deposited thereunder shall be returned to the party of the first
part."32  Through the arrangements of the husband a lawyer was ob-
tained to represent the wife in the Florida divorce action. Fees for this
lawyer were paid by the husband. The wife apparently acquiesced in the
entire arrangement and consulted her own (not the Florida) lawyer. In
the divorce proceeding, the wife's Florida lawyer admitted the jurisdic-
tional allegation and residence of the husband, although from the evi-
dence introduced in the subsequent New Jersey action it was clear that he
was always domiciled in New Jersey.3" The Florida court granted the
27. Jamieson v. Jamieson, 14 III. App. 2d 233, 144 N.E.2d 540 (1957).
28. Id. at 240, 144 N.E.2d at 544.
29. Commonwealth ex rel. Nolde v. Nolde, 105 Pa. Super. 334, 161 Atl. 450 (1932).
30. Commonwealth ex rel. Bowser v. Bowser, 163 Pa. Super. 494, 63 A.2d 117
(1949).
31. 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).
32. Id. at 385, 78 A.2d at 899.
33. He continued to carry on his New Jersey business, maintained his bank accounts
in New Jersey, spent the Christmas holidays in New Jersey with his wife, and attended
husband a divorce. He later reneged on. the property agreement, and his
former wife brought suit in New Jersey to have the divorce decree de-
clared null and void. In holding the Florida divorce invalid, the New
Jersey court said the Sherrer and Coe cases "only apply to a true adver-
sary proceeding where the parties are represented by counsel of their in-
dependent choice and where there is an opportunity to make a voluntary
decision on the question as to whether or not the case should be fully
litigated either on the question of jurisdiction or the merits. .... ""
Although the lack of independent counsel was discussed as an im-
portant factor in permitting a collateral attack, the court's holding was
based on a finding that fraud was perpetrated upon the Florida court.
The fraud had its inception in the settlement agreement in which the
defendant wife agreed to enter any appearance required in the divorce
action and not to oppose any of the proceedings. It continued by the
appearance in the Florida proceedings of an attorney who, although os-
tensibly acting for the wife, was in actuality an agent of the husband.
There was never any intention on the lawyer's part to enter a bona fide
contest on the jurisdictional issue since the husband paid for his services
and controlled his actions. 5
Fraud is an issue in many of the attempts to attack collaterally a
prior divorce decree. There appears to be much conflict in the decisions
but some of it disappears if different types of fraudulent situations are
distinguished. Fraud perpetrated on the divorce court by false state-
ments as to the plaintiff spouse's domicile in the state has been used suc-
cessfully by some courts as a rationale for overcoming the Sherrer doc-
trine. Where the plaintiff spouse is the sole perpetrator of such fraud
without any collusion by the defendant spouse who has participated in the
proceeding, the Sherrer doctrine is clearly applicable and should preclude
a collateral attack. If this were not true, a spouse could always relitigate
the issue of the plaintiff's domicile by alleging that the plaintiff had per-
petrated a fraud on the divorce court. Thus, a California court refused
to allow a collateral attack where the defendant wife had engaged an at-
a number of social functions with her in New Jersey. The court also found that he
did not reside in Florida for the ninety-day statutory period.
34. Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 392, 78 A.2d 896, 902 (1951).
35. In a subsequent New Jersey case, Nappe v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.2d 31
(1956), the parties went to Nevada solely for a divorce and both appeared personally
in the proceedings. The plaintiff wife's residence satisfied the statutory requirement of
Nevada. She was represented by independent counsel of her own choosing, but his fee
was apparently paid by the husband. Subsequently, the wife tried to attack collaterally
the Nevada divorce decree on the grounds of fraud. The New Jersey court refused
to allow such an attack even though the divorce was obtained in violation of the public
policy of New Jersey. The court indicated it might have reached a different result if
the parties had entered into an unlawful agreement to procure a divorce.
NOTES 599
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torney and participated in the proceeding even though the Nevada domi-
cile of the plaintiff husband was questionable. 8 The court held that "the
decree is binding even though a relitigation . . .might result in finding
that the domiciliary claim was fraudulently asserted for the purpose of
obtaining a decree. . . . "" The defendant had full opportunity to con-
test the issue of domicile, including any fraud on the divorce court con-
nected therewith.
Where both spouses, however, are shown to have collusively engaged
in perpetrating a fraud on the divorce court, the New Jersey courts at least
have refused to give full faith and credit to the divorce decree even
though the defendant spouse participated in the divorce proceeding. 8
The Staedler case is illustrative of this point.3" An argument might be
made for not applying the Sherrer doctrine where both spouses partici-
pated in the fraud on the ground that the defendant spouse did not have
full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issue of domicile or that the
subsequent court should not compound a fraud on the divorce court. The
participation of both spouses in the fraud, however, suggests the possible
application of the "clean hands" doctrine to preclude a collateral attack
by either of the parties. The New Jersey court in Staedler declined to
use the doctrine declaring that it "should not be applied where it will
produce a result contra to the firm public policy of this State in a matter
of such fundamental importance as the preservation of the dignity of
the marital relationship.","
A third type of fraud which frequently arises is that where the par-
ticipation of, or the service of process on, the defendant spouse is in-
duced by fraud or coercion on the part of the plaintiff spouse. In these
situations, some state courts have avoided the application of the Sherrer
doctrine. A recent Nebraska case concerns a situation in which service
of process was fraudulently effected on the defendant husband."' A
36. Ieur v. Heur, 33 Cal. 2d 268, 201 P.2d 385 (1949).
37. Id. at 271, 201 P.2d at 387. Accord, In. re Schomaker's Estate, 93 Cal. App.
2d 616, 209 P.2d 669 (1949).
38. Judkins v. Judkins, 22 N.J. Super. 516, 92 A.2d 120 (1952); Chirelstein v.
Chirelstein, 8 N.J. Super. 504, 73 A.2d 628 (1950), miodified on other grounds, 12 N.J.
Super. 468, 79 A.2d 884; Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).
39. Judkins v. Judkins, supra note 38, said that under the principles announced in
Staedler, an Arkansas divorce decree was not entitled to full faith and credit where the
plaintiff wife had signed an affidavit falsely stating that she had been an Arkansas
resident for the required statutory period, and the divorce proceeding was based on
postdated depositions and on an entry of appearance and waiver of service executed
by the husband prior to the wife's departure for Arkansas. The collateral attack,
however, was attempted by the second husband, and the court held that he was estopped
by his conduct from attacking the Arkansas decree.
40. 6 N.J. 380, 394, 78 A.2d 896, 903 (1951).
41. Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955).
600
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wife, without the knowledge of her spouse, instituted a divorce action
in Colorado. The husband was personally served in Colorado after hav-
ing been enticed into the state by his wife on the false pretense that his
presence was required for the sale and conveyance of certain jointly-held
Colorado real estate. The defendant husband made no appearance in the
divorce proceedings, and the divorce was granted. In the subsequent
Nebraska suit, the husband contended and the court found that the record
failed to establish that a bona fide residence existed,42 and that service
of process was obtained by fraud. The Nebraska Supreme Court said:
The Supreme Court of the United States has never held . . .
that full faith and credit must be given to a divorce decree of a
sister state where jurisdiction of the subject matter (domicile)
and procedural due process (personal service of summons) have
each been obtained by fraud. Consequently we hold that the
Colorado decree is subject to collateral attack and under the
state of the record, it is not entitled to full faith and credit in
this state.43
The court conceded that if valid personal service upon the defendant had
been made, it would have felt compelled by the Sherrer doctrine to recog-
nize the divorce. The court, however, refused to extend that doctrine
to cases of fraudulent service of process.44 This conclusion seems to
do no injustice to the Sherrer doctrine.
While in the Nebraska case the husband made no appearance in the
Colorado divorce proceeding, other courts have allowed a collateral at-
tack where the defendant did participate but was induced to do so fraudu-
lently. For instance, in a California case,4" a wife was allowed to attack
a Nevada decree where she apparently signed a power of attorney-al-
though she could not remember doing so-after her husband falsely
represented that another woman was going to bear a child by him and
that he intended to obtain a divorce for the sole purpose of temporarily
marrying the other woman.46  Most of these cases, such as the California
42. The wife's attorney did not file the proper papers within the time allowed by
the Nebraska rules of procedure, so the Nebraska court treated the case on the basis
that it was an established fact that her domicile was in Nebraska at the time of the
Colorado divorce decree.
43. Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 217, 72 N.W.2d 809, 819 (1955).
44. The court also said that an attack on a fraudulently served summons must
ordinarily "be made in the court from which the process was issued, or be treated as a
waiver," but went on to say that "that rule applies only in a case where the court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter." Id. at 215, 72 N.W.2d at 818-19.
45. Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Cal. App. 2d 117, 242 P.2d 41 (1952).
46. In a recent Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499,
144 A.2d 521 (1958), a husband fraudulently told his wife that he had had an affair with
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decision, are within the limits of the Sherrer doctrine because there is no
full opportunity for the defendant spouse to contest the jurisdictional
issue of domicile.
A special appearance by the defendant spouse to contest the jurisdic-
tional issue of domicile has caused some doubt as to whether it satisfies
the Sherrer doctrine although the Supreme Court in dictum has said that
such an appearance bars collateral attack." In a Wisconsin case,48 the
evidence indicated that the defendant wife took no part in the proceed-
ings instituted in Wyoming except to enter a formal special appearance
by counsel objecting to jurisdiction. The Wisconsin court held that the
Wyoming decree was not conclusive and was not entitled to full faith and
credit in Wisconsin. In the language of the court:
[T]he decisions show that the right of the home state to be
considered is not completely gone. Just where the line is to be
drawn is not yet certain. . . . But where the defendant was not
served within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum, did not
attend personally, and took no part in the proceedings except to
enter a formal special appearance by counsel objecting to the
jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked domicile, the status of
the decree has not been passed upon.4
After quoting language from Johi nson v. Mluelberger, in which the Su-
another woman which resulted in her pregnancy. He claimed that the brothers of the
woman threatened him with arrest, disgrace, and bodily harm if he did not marry her.
Upon the false promise of the husband that he was only marrying the other woman for
the purpose of giving the child a name and that he would then remarry her, the wife
signed a separation agreement and also a power of attorney containing a waiver of
summons, entry of appearance, and submission to the jurisdiction of a Mexican District
Court. The Mexican divorce was not recognized in Pennsylvania because it was
evident that the husband never intended to establish a domicile in Mexico, and because
the wife's submission to the Mexican court was obtained by duress, fraud, and coersion.
In this case, however, it should be noted that full faith and credit does not apply to the
decrees of courts of foreign countries. Under similar facts, other courts have permitted
collateral attacks on the decrees of other states where a defendant spouse was induced
to participate by fraudulent means. In Ryan v. Ryan, 139 F. Supp. 98 (D.C. 1954), aff'd
per curiam, 230 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court permitted a collateral attack
where the husband secured his wife's signature to a power of attorney and a property
settlement agreement which completely terminated his financial responsibilities to her,
such signatures being obtained at a time when she was acutely upset, had periodic
attacks of hysteria and experienced great mental turmoil. In Averbuck v. Averbuck,
270 App. Div. 116, 58 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1945), a wife was allowed to attack collaterally
a Nevada divorce decree where as a result of false representation, acts of coercion
and duress on the pait of the defendant husband, the particulars not being specified
by the New York court, the wife appeared in the divorce proceeding and interposed
a cross-complaint.
47. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951).
48. Davis v. Davis, 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W.2d 338 (1951).
49. Id. at 6, 47 N.W.2d at 341.
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preme Court of the United States used the words "personal appearance,"
the Wisconsin court went on to say:
We know "general" and "special" appearances but we have little
help from the books in construing "personal appearance." We
conclude that the court means that the party came into court in
his or her own person, as the party had done in the Sherrer and
Coe Cases."°
It appears to be a clear perversion of the Supreme Court cases for the
Wisconsin court to hold that the physical presence of a defendant spouse
before the divorcing court is necessary before he is precluded from a col-
lateral attack. The Wisconsin court apparently was unaware that John-
son. v. Muelberger, which was cited as authority in the Wisconsin opinion,
involved appearance by counsel only.
Application of the Slerrer doctrine hinges on an opportunity to con-
test the jurisdictional issue, and a special appearance by counsel objecting
to jurisdiction seems clearly to satisfy the doctrine. In contrast to the
Wisconsin case, other state courts have followed this rationale by hold-
ing that a special appearance to contest plaintiff's domicile precludes col-
lateral attack. 1
Whether participation by the defendant spouse after the entry of
a divorce decree entitles the decree to full faith and credit has not been
decided by the Supreme Court, and there is a split of authority among
the states. A Massachusetts case permitted a defendant wife to attack
collaterally a Nevada decree where the wife did not appear or answer
before the decree was granted, but later entered a special appearance ques-
tioning jurisdiction. - On the other hand, New York has held that an
appearance after entry of the divorce decree will preclude collateral at-
tack. 3 The defendant wife defaulted in a divorce action instituted in
Georgia but appeared within the statutory thirty-day period to plead
50. Id. at 7, 47 N.W.2d at 341.
51. Cherry v. Cherry, 202 Ga. 213, 65 S.E.2d 805, modified, 208 Ga. 726, 69 S.E.2d
252 (1951) ; Henricks v. Henricks, 275 App. Div. 642, 92 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1949) ; Perry
v. Perry, 51 Wash. 2d 358, 318 P.2d 968 (1958). In each case, under the law of the
divorcing state the special appearance was held to subject the pleader to the court for all
issues. Even in states where the defendant may specially appear solely to contest the
issue of jurisdiction and not subject himself to the court's jurisdiction for other issues,
the Sherrcr doctrine should operate to preclude collateral attack.
52. Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 324 Mass. 340, 86 N.E.2d 654 (1954). The Massa-
chusetts court felt that the Nevada proceedings were ex parte and that the findings
of jurisdictional facts could be re-examined since "up to and including the decisive
date of the decree there was no appearance or participation by the defendant wife."
Id. at 343, 86 N.E.2d at 655.
53. Carnegie v. Carnegie, 198 Misc. 448, 98 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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good cause for modifying or setting aside the decree. The Georgia
court, however, refused to grant her a hearing on the merits because she
failed to show good reasons for her original default. The New York
court refused to permit a collateral attack by holding that the defendant
wife's submission to the Georgia court was as complete, and her election
of the forum as final, as if her application had been successful. Under
Sherrer, participation after the entry of a divorce decree should preclude
the parties from a collateral attack providing the subsequent appearance
gives the defendant spouse an opportunity to contest the issue of domi-
cile. Under this rationale, both the Massachusetts and New York cases
appear incorrect. 4
New problems arise where the validity of a foreign divorce decree
is attacked by a third party or "stranger" to the divorce proceeding." In
general, state courts have permitted a stranger to attack collaterally an
ex parte divorce decree where the parties themselves were not precluded
from attacking such decree." In a New York case, third parties sought
to recover letters of administration issued to decedent's second wife by
showing that she was not in fact decedent's surviving spouse since the
divorce from her first husband was invalid. The New York court, with-
out resort to Nevada law, permitted the third parties to attack the divorce
since it was an ex parte decree.5"
Where, however, the parties to a divorce are precluded from making
a collateral attack, the Supreme Court has indicated that the validity of
the divorce decree can be challenged by a stranger only if the law of the
divorce state permits collateral attack by the stranger of a domestic de-
cree. 8 Thus, a third party to a divorce proceeding may be able to attack
54. In Weber v. Weber, 110 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1951), a husband entered
a general appearance in the Nevada court subsequent to a Nevada divorce decree. A
modified judgment and decree of divorce was thereupon entered. The New York court
did not permit the husband to attack collaterally. This decision seems to be in accord
with the Sherrer doctrine since the husband had the opportunity to contest the jurisdic-
tional issue.
55. It would seem that a completely disinterested third party would not be per-
mitted to make a collateral attack. State courts, however, differ as to what type of
interest the third party must have and when the interest must be present.
56. E.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 274 App. Div. 43, 79 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
In re Veltri's Estate, 202 Misc. 401, 113 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Surr. Ct. 1952) ; Ex pare Nim-
mer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716 (1948). But see Evans v. Asphalt Road & Materials
Co., 194 Va. 165, 72 S.E.2d 321 (1952).
57. In re Veltri's Estate, supra note 56.
58. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951). The Mutelberger case held that "when a divorce cannot be attacked for lack
of jurisdiction by parties actually before the court or strangers in the rendering state,
it cannot be attacked by them anywhere in the Union." 340 U.S. at 589. There is an
implication, however, that if Florida would have allowed this stranger to attack
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the validity of the decree on the ground of lack of domicile of the parties
although the parties themselves could not make such an attack. 9 State
courts differ as to whether such a collateral attack may be made. Florida
allows a collateral attack by those third parties who, if the decree were
given full faith and credit, would be prejudiced in regard to a pre-
existing right.60 A more liberal Massachusetts court, admitting that
there were no property interests of the third person at the time the decree
was granted, nevertheless held that a third party could attack the decree
if the rights were subsequently affected."'
Even if the parties to a divorce or strangers are precluded from col-
laterally attacking a decree, a state might still be able to attack. Language
in the second Williams case indicates that the parties cannot foreclose the
right of a state to bring a collateral attack.62  The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has yet to be confronted with this specific problem.
The preceding discussion shows that the state courts have had dif-
ficulty in determining what constitutes sufficient participation on the
part of the defendant spouse to bring the Sherrer doctrine of res judicata
collaterally, then other states could also. The court decided that under Florida law, the
attacking daughter could not have prevailed regardless of whether she was considered
in privity with her father as to his estate or whether she was a stranger to the divorce
proceeding.
59. The crucial question again becomes what kind of participation will take the
divorce proceedings out of the ex parte classification. In Chusid v. Chusid, 207 Misc.
1039, 142 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1955), a third party was not allowed to attack an
ex parte Nevada divorce where the defendant wife in that action, subsequent to the
decree, entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff which provided that she
would enter an appearance for the purpose of submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Nevada court. Since Nevada law authorized such action, i.e., making a vulnerable
decree invulnerable by subsequent amendment, the New York court gave the decree
full faith and credit. Adherence to the Supreme Court decisions indicates that the
court should have considered whether Nevada would permit a stranger to attack,
regardless of the fact that the proceedings were not ex parte. The Nevada law,
however, is not clear on this point.
60. Johnson v. Muelberger, supra note 58; de Marigny v. de Marigny, 43 So. 2d
442 (Fla. 1945). Other states which have used the pre-existing right theory include
Mumma v. Mumma, 86 Cal. App. 2d 133, 194 P.2d 24 (1948) ; Reger v. Reger, 316 Mo.
1310, 293 S.W. 414 (1927); In re Englund's Estate, 45 Wash. 2d 708, 277 P.2d 717
(1954).
61. Old Colony Trust Company v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
62. "Those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the interested
actions of others; especially not a State which is concerned with the vindication of its
own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective means, to protect that interest
against the selfish action of those outside its border. The State of domiciliary origin
should not be bound by an unfounded, even if not collusive, recital in the record of a
court of another State. As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon
which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion
of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a right,
when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of
that crucial fact." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
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into play 3 A number of the cases are hard to reconcile with the Slerrer
rationale and seem to support the Nebraska court's feeling that the Su-
preme Court decisions in this area "each cover a very narrow situation,
and . . . they will not be applied to situations other than those which
they specifically decide."6
A divorce action is different from an action for tort or breach of
contract.6" There, if the defendant is in court and the court is competent
to proceed in this type of action, the jurisdictional requirements are satis-
fied. On the other hand, the background of divorce litigation and legis-
lation indicates that divorce is not considered a transitory personal action.
Marriage is a matter of public concern as well as a matter of interest to
the parties. The state has an interest in its dissolution as well as its for-
mation. As was noted earlier, the state that has this interest is the state
of domicile. Justice Frankfurter stated in the second Williams case that
"under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdic-
tion, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile.""
A trend away from the requisite of domicile, however, seems to be
developing.. The language of Sherrer and the other Supreme Court cases
still insists that domicile is necessary. In practice, however, two spouses
can appear and admit the jurisdictional requirements of domicile in a
divorce-mill state and receive a divorce without a bona fide domicile
there; the divorce-mill states invariably fail to inquire seriously into the
63. Cases limiting the effect given a foreign ex parte divorce decree which
deserve some mention, but which are not germane to the general purpose of this
discussion, concern the concept of divisible divorce. While a divorce proceeding is
usually considered an action in rem, an award for child support or alimony is a personal
judgment. In two Supreme Court cases, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), and
Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948), the Court conceded that a divorcing court
has jurisdiction to grant a divorce decree in an ex parte proceeding that is entitled to
full faith and credit. Nevertheless, since the divorce court lacks jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant spouse, it is without power to adjudicate the defendant's right
to alimony under a prior judgment. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957),
the Court carried this theory even further, allowing the wife to obtain an alimony award
in New York after the husband had obtained a valid ex parte divorce in Nevada expressly
denying such an obligation. Thus it appears that in an ex parte divorce, the divorcing
state may terminate the marital status, but cannot tamper with the economic rights of the
absent spouse.
64. Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 216, 72 N.W.2d 809, 819 (1955).
65. In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 358 (1948), justice Frankfurter, in a
dissenting opinion, said: "If the marriage contract were no different from a contract
to sell an automobile, the parties thereto might well be permitted to bargain away all
interests involved, in or out of court. But the State has an interest in the family
relations of its citizens vastly different from the interest it has in an ordinary commercial
transaction. That interest cannot be bartered or bargained away by the immediate
parties to the controversy by a default or an arranged contest in a proceeding for
divorce in a State to which the parties are strangers."
66. 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
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issue of domicile. There have been some statutes enacted that authorize
the granting of divorces to non-domiciliaries. A Virgin Islands statute
provided that six weeks' presence should be prima facie evidence of
domicile, and that the court should have jurisdiction of a divorce action
after six weeks' residence by the plaintiff where the defendant has been
personally served or has appeared, without further reference to domicile.67
In a case arising under this statute, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit said that domestic relations are a matter of concern to the state
where a party is domiciled, and an attempt by another jurisdiction to af-
fect the marital relations of the foreign domiciliary is unconstitutional
even though both parties are in court and neither one raises the ques-
tion."8 The Supreme Court vacated this judgment as the question became
moot upon the parties receiving a proper divorce in another state.69 A
New York court, relying on a state statute, has held that it had jurisdic-
tion to gTant a divorce to non-residents who were married in New York,
and that jurisdiction for divorce does not always depend upon domicile."0
This discussion of domicile is relevant to the participation question
in that state courts are faced with a dilemma when it is obvious that
neither of the spouses was a bona fide domiciliary and yet the parties
should be precluded from a collateral attack because of their participation
in the divorce proceeding. As long as domicile is necessary for jurisdic-
tion, the states will not want the laws of the divorce-mill states to control
the marital status of persons who are not domiciliaries of those states.
Perhaps a greater degree of certainty in divorce law would be possible
if the domicile requirement were abandoned. Yet, the requirement of
domicile seems to be the best way to establish state jurisdiction and should
be abolished only if federal jurisdiction or uniformity in state divorce
laws were established. Numerous proposals for constitutional amend-
ments authorizing federal legislation in domestic relations have failed, as
have repeated efforts at uniform state legislation."' Therefore, despite
a trend away from the jurisdictional requirement of domicile, it probably
will not be replaced in the near future.
Since domicile is a prerequisite to jurisdiction of a divorce action, it
follows that a collateral attack should be permitted if a divorce court did
67. Divorce Law of Virgin Islands, § 9, as amended. Laws 1953, Bill No. 55.
68. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). The dissenting opinion, however,
held that domicile is not constitutionally necessary and is unsatisfactory in many in-
stances.
69. Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
70. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
71. See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 364(1948).
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n6t have jurisdiction of the subject matter. But a court should not turn
its back on the full faith and credit clause as readily as many of the state
courts have been prone to do when considering a divorce decree rendered
in a sister state. The Sherrer doctrine has been developed to give some
certainty to the marital status. If a spouse has participated in a divorce
proceeding in such a manner as to constitute a full opportunity to contest
the issue of the other spouse's domicile, he should not be heard to com-
plain in a later action. It must be assumed that most courts will not issue
a divorce unless they have proper jurisdiction. Further, since domicile
encompasses a mental state at the time of the divorce proceeding, the
rendering court is in the best position to determine if it has jurisdiction.
Some divorce-mill courts, of course, have abused their power and will
probably continue to do so. Nevertheless, they are the exception and un-
fortunately must be tolerated. Even in such states, if a spouse had a full
opportunity to contest jurisdiction, he must be estopped from raising the
question in a subsequent action if we are to have any certainty in our
divorce laws.
Most of the state court decisions limiting the Sherrer doctrine are
individualized. Perhaps there has been a consistency to attack the doc-
trine where the plaintiff spouse or both spouses collusively have perpe-
trated a fraud on the divorce court. It seems only equitable that the
courts should not allow a collateral attack when the complaining party
has already participated sufficiently in the prior divorce action to invoke
the Sherrer doctrine. If the courts allow collateral attacks under such
circumstances, they are simply bending to the changing whim of an in-
dividual. It does seem, however, that the subsequent court should be
permitted to be relatively liberal in finding a lack of full opportunity
when it is obvious that there was no bona fide domicile. This should
especially be true where one spouse appears to have been coerced or duped
by the other spouse, or where there is a great disparity in educational
backgrounds.
Nevertheless, complete certainty as to what constitutes participation
on the part of a non-resident defendant in a divorce action which is suf-
ficient to entitle the decree to full faith and credit in a sister state on the
jurisdictional issue of bona fide domicile will be established only after
further decisions by the Supreme Court.
